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Non-compliance, board structures and the performance of financial firms during crisis: 
UK Evidence 
Abstract 
This paper examines the effectiveness of internal corporate governance mechanisms for improving 
the performance of financial firms in the UK. The research is first of its kind to look into the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance of financial firms in the UK before 
and during the financial crisis. Using Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) estimates that 
control for dynamic endogeneity, this study shows that firm performance as measured by Total 
Shareholder Returns (TSR) and Return on Equity (ROE) is negatively associated with the level of 
non-compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code. The study also finds that having higher 
number of internal controls is most effective monitoring mechanism and is positively associated 
with firm performance. However, board independence represented by the number of non-executive 
directs (NEDs) is the least effective monitoring mechanism and is negatively associated with the 
performance of firms. The study also shows that directors’ share ownership is an effective 
incentive mechanism for aligning their interests with shareholders as it is positively associated 
with firm performance. However, the findings suggest that remuneration is negatively associated 
with performance. Finally, the study provides evidence which indicates that board size impact the 
performance of firms differently in different time periods. As proposed by agency theory the study 
provides evidence that shows the positive impact of effective monitoring and incentive alignment 
for performance. It also provides support for the resource dependence view that directors are a 
critical resource during difficult economic times. 
Key words: Corporate governance; Non-compliance; internal controls; directors’ share ownership 
; independence; committees; GMM 
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1. Introduction 
Agency theory predicts a positive relationship between firm-level governance mechanisms that 
enhance monitoring and align directors’ interests with shareholders. Similarly, resource 
dependence theory predicts that any firm-level governance mechanisms that better connects a firm 
with its external environment could have positive impact on its performance. This research 
examines the relationship between firm-level corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance during a financial crisis. In this paper we contribute to the understanding of the 
importance of contextual factors on the impact of non-compliance with a prescribed corporate 
governance code on the performance of financial firms before and during a financial crisis. To do 
so, the paper investigates the impact of non-compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code 
on firm performance. In addition to this, we also investigate the effectiveness of two key internal 
corporate governance mechanisms i.e. monitoring and directors’ incentives for improving the 
performance of financial firms during two economically different time periods. 
It has been widely accepted in the corporate governance literature that the separation of ownership 
and control in modern corporations gives rise to agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is 
argued that corporate governance  enhances economic efficiency and protects the interests of an 
organisations’ stakeholders (Kay, 1996). Existing corporate governance literature, based 
predominantly upon agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen and Murphy, 1990, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) suggests that firm-level good corporate governance mechanisms 
enhance the value of firms in the normal times by effectively monitoring directors and aligning 
their interests with shareholders’ interests.  However, the validity of such claims in extraordinary 
economic conditions such as financial crisis and for different types of firms has been questioned 
recently (Judge, 2012, Van Essen et al., 2013) . 
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Recent research identifies a number of factors that may influence the effectiveness of corporate 
governance prescriptions. These factors include national economic development (Chen et al., 
2011), national institutions (Carney et al., 2011, Henrekson and Jakobsson, 2012, Renders and 
Gaeremynck, 2012), industry context (Chancharat et al., 2012), ownership structure (Desender et 
al., 2013) and firm’s financial condition and stage in its life-cycle (Dowell et al., 2011).  
The 2007–08 transatlantic credit crisis has prompted some scholars to argue that inadequacies in 
the corporate governance mechanisms of financial firms could be one of the most probable causes 
of the crisis (Gregoriou, 2009, Kirkpatrick, 2009). Muller-Kahle & Lewellyn (2011) present 
evidence that boards of directors failed to monitor executives and evaluate the risks they were 
taking. On the other hand, Conyon et al. (2011) argue that institutional failings in governing risk 
management, corporate governance standards, credit rating and financial reporting standards were 
to blame. 
 The 2007–08 crisis led to reviews of corporate governance standards around the world. For 
instance, in the UK Sir David Walker was asked by the British government to review corporate 
governance mechanisms in UK banks. The Walker review (2009) recommended substantial 
changes to the way the boards of banks and big financial institutions function in regards to 
corporate governance. Similarly, the Financial Reporting Council1 (FRC) in the UK also revised 
the corporate governance code in 2010, 2012 and 2014 and issued a new corporate governance 
code for institutional investors called The UK Stewardship Code. 
We contribute to the existing literature by providing a unique focus on the governance mechanisms 
and performance of UK financial firms before and during the crises. Firms in the financial sector 
                                                 
1 The Financial Reporting Council is the UK’s independent regulator responsible for promoting high quality corporate 
governance and reporting. 
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are required to report their compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code on the basis of 
‘comply or explain’ in the same way as non-financial firms. However, no study so far has analysed 
the association between the level of compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code and 
performance for financial sector. The recent financial crisis has highlighted that any problems in 
the financial sector could have devastating impact on other firms in various industries and indeed 
the whole economy of a country. Therefore, it is very important to understand the corporate 
governance mechanisms of financial firms and its association with performance. 
Furthermore, the time period of the study is also unique, as it covers a relatively stable economic 
time period before the financial crisis which commenced in July 2007 (Aebi et al., 2012, Beltratti 
and Stulz, 2012, Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011) as well as a challenging and unstable time period 
when the financial crisis materialised. This provides an opportunity to analyse how non-
compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code is associated with firms’ performance in two 
different time periods of economic activity. 
Another contribution of the study comes from the use of Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) 
approach to analyse the data. In a recent study, Wintoki et al. (2012) highlight that the mixed 
results in the governance-performance literature are attributed to using inappropriate statistical 
techniques. They argue that employing proper statistical tools (i.e. GMM) could produce more 
consistent results. Therefore, GMM has been used in this study to contribute to this debate. 
Using a sample of 86 UK financial firms, which includes banks, insurance, real estate and financial 
services for the period 2003–2010, this study shows that firm performance is negatively associated 
with the level of non-compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code.  This result shows that 
financial firms that are compliant with a prescribed code of good corporate governance perform 
better than those that are non-compliant. The study also reports that a higher number of internal 
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controls within financial firms could be an effective monitoring tool as it is positively associated 
with firm performance both before as well as during the financial crisis.  
Results also show that another key monitoring tool i.e. board independence is significantly 
negatively associated with performance and financial firms with a higher number of NEDs 
experienced a greater decline in their ROE during the crisis period as compared with their 
counterparts with a lower ratio of NEDs. This could indicate that increasing the number of NEDs 
in financial firms is not an effective monitoring tool and is counterproductive. Furthermore, this 
negative relationship between board independence and performance is statistically stronger in the 
crisis period when compared with the pre-crisis period, indicating that context may affect the 
governance-performance relationship. It could also indicate that NEDs have less knowledge of the 
working of financial firms, they might not be able to provide strategic advice and monitor 
executive management when it is needed most during financial crisis (Adams, 2012).  
Another key finding of the study is that out of the two incentive mechanisms (directors’ share 
ownership and remuneration), increasing directors’ share ownership is more effective mechanisms 
as it is positively associated with performance. Remuneration on the other hand, is negatively 
associated with the performance of financial firms and could indicate that it is not an effective 
governance mechanisms to align directors’ interest with shareholders’ interests. 
Results of the study also show that in the case of board size there is evidence, which indicates that 
corporate governance mechanisms impact the performance of firms differently in the pre-crisis 
and crisis times. This finding contributes to the growing body of literature that questions the 
universality of corporate governance prescriptions (Aguilera et al., 2008, Desender et al., 2013, 
Dowell et al., 2011, Judge, 2012, Van Essen et al., 2013). 
6 
 
The paper is organised as follows: the next section outlines the existing literature on corporate 
governance indices and individual corporate governance mechanisms and presents the testable 
hypotheses of the study. Following that the data used and methodology adopted are discussed. The 
fourth Section outlines the results and discussion and the final section concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
Theoretical link between governance and performance 
In the existing literature the link between corporate governance and performance can be explained 
with the help of three theories i.e. agency theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence 
theory. The problems that arise from the separation of ownership and control in modern day 
organisations can be traced back to as early as 1776, when (Smith, 1776) highlighted the potential 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers in joint stock companies. However, it was 
not until late 20th century when Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed a theory outlining the 
potential issues arising from the separation of ownership and control. Since then agency theory 
has been the most commonly used theoretical framework to analyse the governance-performance 
relationship. 
Agency theory assumes that both parties (i.e. owners and managers) in the agency relationship are 
wealth maximisers, they have different attitudes towards risk and they have different goals (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). This conflict of interest between owners (who own the company) and 
managers or directors (who control the company) leads to agency costs, which could include, the 
costs arising from inefficient use of resources, monitoring costs incurred by owners, investment in 
risky projects, risk averse behaviour of directors or business resources being used by directors for 
personal gains (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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Hart (1995) argues that the transaction costs are such that these agency costs cannot be dealt with 
through contracts. Furthermore, in the case of dispersed ownership, small shareholders lack 
motivation and resources to actively monitor directors (Macey and O'Hara, 2003). As directors 
have control over the free cash flows of a firm, corporate governance mechanisms are needed to 
monitor directors so that they are not risk averse and self-serving, to make them accountable and 
to make sure that the free cash flows are returned to shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The 
increased monitoring and accountability will lead to efficient use of organisational resources and 
will be translated into improved profitability (Jensen, 1986). Furthermore, based on agency theory 
it is assumed that strong internal corporate governance mechanisms will lead to a decrease in 
agency costs, which will lead to lower premiums being charged by the providers of capital. 
Therefore, leading to lower cost of capital (Drobetz et al., 2004). 
Based on the assumptions of agency theory, it can be argued that better corporate governance may 
be linked to, efficient use of resources (profitability), long term success and better equipped to face 
difficult times such as financial crisis, increased share price and lower risk. Irrespective of the 
economic conditions, firms with strong internal corporate governance mechanisms should perform 
better than firms with weak internal corporate governance mechanisms. 
Agency theory assumes that directors are more inclined to work for their self-interests and proper 
monitoring and incentive mechanisms should be in place to align their interests with shareholders. 
On the other hand, stewardship theory assumes that executives (agents) are trustworthy individuals 
and will pursue organisational interests even when such interests are in conflict with the their self-
interest (Donaldson, 1990, Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Furthermore, stewardship theory assumes 
that competitive internal and external market discipline, coupled with the fear of damaging their 
future managerial capital, ensures that agency costs are minimised. In addition to this, stewardship 
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theory assumes that the executive directors know the company very well and have superior formal 
and informal knowledge about the firm. Therefore, they are in a good position to make better 
decisions for the company (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Consequently, the proponents of 
stewardship theory argue that improved organisational performance can be achieved by 
governance mechanisms that encourage collaboration and trust (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). 
Another theory which demonstrates why internal corporate governance mechanisms could affect 
firm performance is the resource dependence theory. This theory assumes that corporate 
governance mechanisms such as boards of directors are not only necessary for monitoring, but also 
serve as a critical link between the firm and all the essential resources it needs for successful 
operations (Pfeffer, 1972, Selznick, 1966). Boards of directors link organisations to external 
resources and are mechanisms for managing external dependencies as well as reducing 
environmental uncertainties which organisations may be faced with (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Resource dependence theory assumes that directors could be an important resource for the firm in 
a number of ways. First, boards of directors bring experience, knowledge and independence (i.e. 
in the case of NEDs) to the firm. Second, they can bring reputation and critical business contacts 
to the firm (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Third, boards of directors also provide access to 
businesses/political elite, information and capital (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007).  Finally, boards of 
directors link organisations to the external environment and important stakeholders such as 
creditors, suppliers, competitors, and customers (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). This link to external 
resources could have positive effects on the performance of firms. 
In context of this study, agency and resource dependence theories seem appropriate frameworks 
to investigate the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and 
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performance. This is because the UK Corporate Governance Code clearly states that the main 
purpose of the Code is to improve governance that will lead to better performance.   
Good corporate governance should contribute to better company performance by 
helping a board discharge its duties in the best interests of shareholders; if it is 
ignored, the consequence may well be vulnerability or poor performance. Good 
governance should facilitate efficient, effective and entrepreneurial management that 
can deliver shareholder value over the longer term..(FRC, 2008, p.1) 
The above quote clearly shows that the FRC is of the view that corporate governance mechanisms 
are needed to control the problems arising from the separation of ownership and control. In line 
with this most of the good corporate governance practices recommended by the Code aim to 
improve monitoring, accountability and transparency.  
The peculiarities of financial institutions such as their opaqueness, heavy regulation and tendency 
to being subject to government bailouts all mean that a greater understanding about factors linked 
to their effective corporate governance is very important. As banks and other financial institutions 
are subject to government bailouts it means that shareholders are less engaged in monitoring 
activities and directors are encouraged to engage in more risky activities (Staikouras et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, intense government regulation weakens other external governance mechanisms such 
as, hostile takeovers, competition etc. (Levine, 2004). As a result, internal governance mechanisms 
such as board structure and disciplining managerial behaviour might help in mitigating the agency 
problems in banks (Andres and Vallelado, 2008, Pathan, 2009, Staikouras et al., 2007).  
In line with this, Zahra and Pearce (1989) report that the effectiveness of the board of directors 
mainly depends on the corporate board structure. Furthermore, Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2010) document that board size, independence and executive compensation are of a particular 
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importance in mitigating the agency problems in financial institutions whereas, Belghitar and 
Clark (2015) show that monitoring mechanisms such as, board size and board composition play 
an effective role in reducing agency costs in large firms. In addition, Barakat and Hussainey (2013) 
argue that by taking outside directors on their corporate boards European banks could enhance 
their own risk disclosure mechanisms. 
In the context of this study corporate governance quality of financial firms will be assessed using 
two types of measures. The first measure takes into account the level of compliance with the 
provisions of the UK Corporate Governance Code. High level of compliance with the Code would 
indicate strong internal corporate governance mechanisms. The second proxy takes into account a 
number of individual corporate governance mechanisms related to monitoring (NEDs, board 
committees, internal controls and board size) and incentives (compensation and share ownership). 
The performance of financial firms is measured by two proxies TSR (total shareholder returns), 
and ROE (return on equity). TSR is calculated as the sum of capital gains and dividend yields 
(Shabbir and Padgett, 2008). The return on equity (ROE) is calculated as net income (net profit 
after tax) divided by the book value of equity. 
Literature on each of the governance measures is reviewed in the next section. 
Corporate governance indices and performance 
 Indices have been developed by commercial organisations as well as researchers and have been 
widely used to study the link between internal corporate governance and the performance of firms 
(see for example, Aggarwal et al., 2011, Brown and Caylor, 2006, Farag et al., 2014, Gompers et 
al., 2003, Gupta et al., 2013, Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012). The main advantage of using a 
composite measure is that it can provide a holistic picture and more information about the 
corporate governance of a firm (Bikiris and Doukakis, 2011). Based on the agency theory a key 
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assumption in using these indices is that a higher level of compliance with a prescribed code of 
corporate governance will reflect better monitoring and control mechanisms to safeguard the 
interest of shareholders. Therefore, a positive relationship between the level of compliance and 
corporate performance (both operating and stock market) can be expected. 
However, the empirical evidence in this regard is mixed. There are a number of US based studies 
that report a positive relationship between corporate governance indices and performance 
(Aggarwal et al., 2010, Bebchuk et al., 2009, Bruno and Claessens, 2010, Cremers and Nair, 2005, 
Gillan et al., 2004, Gompers et al., 2003). On the other hand, some US based studies have 
challenged the validity of these studies and report that there is no relationship between corporate 
governance indices and performance (Bhagat et al., 2008, Core et al., 2006). 
Similarly, mixed results are also reported in the European context. Bauer et al. (2004) use the 
Deminor governance ratings for a sample of 123 European companies (FTSE Europstar 300) for 
the period 2000 to 2001 and report a negative relationship between compliance and the 
performance of firms. On the other hand, using the same index as employed by Bauer et al. (2004) 
but using return on assets (ROA) and net profit margin (NPM) to measure performance, Vander 
Bauwhede (2009) reports a positive relationship between compliance and ROA. Similarly, using 
a compliance index for a sample of Swiss firms Beiner et al. (2006) also report a positive 
relationship between the level of compliance and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. These 
studies highlight that results are affected by proxy for firm performance and the challenge it poses 
for researchers as using a different measure of performance could produce different results. 
In the UK context, Shabbir & Padgett (2008) report a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between compliance with the Code and firms’ market value measured by total 
shareholder returns (TSR) in a study of 122 non-financial FTSE 350 companies for 2000-2003 
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period. Similarly, Dahya & McConnel (2007) study non-financial listed firms during the period 
1989–1996 and find a positive relationship between compliance and performance. More recently 
Farag et al. (2014) studied a sample of UK firms listed on the Altrnative Investment Market (AIM) 
and report a positive relationship between corporate governance characteristics and financial 
performance.  
Dahya & McConnel (2007) and Shabbir & Padgett (2008) both analyse only the non-financial 
sector, while Farag et al. (2014) only focus on the AIM firms. In addition, they also study the 
association between compliance and performance in a relatively stable economic time period.  To 
the best of our knowledge, no study has so far analysed the association between the level of non-
compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code and performance for financial firms in the 
UK and also during a financial crisis. We test the following hypothesis for the relationship between 
non-compliance and performance. 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the level of non-compliance with the UK 
Corporate Governance Code and the performance of financial firms.  
Board structures and performance of financial firms 
To get a more holistic picture of the corporate governance structures of the sample firms and to 
make the study more comparable with the existing literature, we also include a number of 
individual corporate governance mechanisms related to monitoring and directors’ incentives. 
Effective monitoring and directors’ incentives which will align the interests of directors and 
shareholders are considered to be essential for minimising agency costs and improving firm 
performance (Bozec, 2005, Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1993). Therefore, the following 
individual corporate governance mechanisms are included in the study: (1) board independence, 
(2) internal control systems, (3) extra board committees, (4) board size, (5) directors’ share 
13 
 
ownership and (6) remuneration. The first four mechanisms could be considered as related to 
monitoring of directors while the last two are related to incentives (used for aligning directors’ 
interests with shareholders’ interests). 
Directors monitoring and performance 
Agency theory predicts that one of the key mechanisms to overcome agency problems is effective 
monitoring of directors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Effective monitoring of directors would 
ensure that firms’ resources are used efficiently which will lead to improved firm performance 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). There is empirical evidence that shows the positive impact of 
effective monitoring mechanisms on performance (see for example,Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 
2007, Jackling and Johl, 2009). In the UK context for non-financial firms, Weir et al. (2002) study 
311 listed firms for the period 1994 to 1996 and report a positive relationship between presence of 
NEDs and the performance of firms measured by Tobin’s Q. Similarly, Dahya & McConnell 
(2005) studying a sample of 700 UK listed firms for the period 1988–1999 report that the 
appointment of outside directors lead to higher stock returns as well as better decision making by 
board of directors. In addition, the positive impact of the presence of board committees on the 
performance of firms has also been documented (Chen and Zhou, 2007, Chen and Lee, 2008, Sun 
and Cahan, 2009, Xie et al., 2003).  
The UK Corporate Governance Code requires every FTSE 350 firm to put in place a system of 
internal controls and carry out an annual review of the system of internal controls. A greater 
number of internal controls within an organisation will indicate that it has strong mechanisms to 
manage risks and that there is greater accountability and improved monitoring. Therefore, firms 
with more internal controls in place should demonstrate better performance when compared with 
their counterparts with fewer internal controls. Some studies have analysed the association 
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between internal controls and accruals (Doyle et al., 2007), earning quality (Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al., 2009) and CEO compensation (Hoitash et al., 2012). However, no study so far has analysed 
the impact of internal control systems on firm performance. Therefore, this is one of unique 
contributions of this study in this area.  
The link between board size and firm performance has been extensively researched in the existing 
literature. However, the results are inconclusive with some studies showing a negative relationship 
(Huang et al., 2009, Jensen, 1993, Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, Yermack, 1996) and others showing 
a positive relationship (Chaganti et al., 1985, Coles et al., 2008, John and Senbet, 1998, Van den 
Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Based on the resource dependence theory the proponents of the positive 
relationship between board size and performance argue that firms with large corporate boards will 
have greater diversity, skills, experience, and business contacts. Such firms will be better equipped 
to perform well in competitive environments and will have greater opportunity to acquire critical 
resources during crisis times (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, Mangena et al., 2012, Yawson, 2006). 
Furhtermore, in the case of financial firms it has been documented that due to the complex business 
structure and big size of such firms a positive relationship between board size and performance 
could be expected (Aebi et al., 2012, Belkhir, 2009).  
The above review of the literature shows that effective monitoring should lead to improved 
performance. Therefore, we test the following hypothesis: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between effective monitoring (represented by board 
independence, higher number of internal controls, extra board committees and large boards) and 
the performance of financial firms.  
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Directors incentives and performance 
Agency theory predicts that providing incentives to directors will motivate them, which could 
reduce the conflict of interest between directors and shareholders and will lead to improved 
performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The two commonly used incentive mechanisms to 
reduce agency problems are directors’ share ownership and performance based remuneration. 
Agency theory suggests that increasing directors’ share ownership helps to reduce agency 
problems and will positively impact firm performance (Fama, 1980, Florackis, 2005, Florackis 
and Ozkan, 2008, Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Mangena et al., 2012). This positive relationship 
between share ownership and performance is achieved by aligning the interests of directors with 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Similarly, the positive impact of remuneration on 
performance has also been documented in the existing literature (Bayless, 2009, Benito and 
Conyon, 1999, Florackis, 2005, Ozkan, 2011).  
The above review of the literature shows that agency theory predicts a positive relationship 
between directors’ incentives and firm performance. Therefore, we test the following hypothesis: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between directors’ incentives (represented by 
directors’ share ownership and remuneration) and the performance of financial firms.  
3. Data and methodology 
Model 
This research covers a period of eight years for 86 firms. Therefore, the data is panel data which 
has the benefit of controlling for the effect of variables which cannot be observed or measured 
(e.g. director personality, management quality and corporate strategy etc.) (Gujarati, 2003). 
However, as these unobserved effects cannot be measured, it leads to correlation between 
independent variables and error term in the case of panel data and violates one of the basic 
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assumptions of ordinary least square regression (OLS). Hence, using OLS will produce 
inconsistent results (Wooldridge, 2002). In addition to this, the empirical econometric models in 
finance research often encounter issue of endogeneity (Schultz et al., 2010). Wintoki et al. (2012) 
report at least three sources of endogeneity in the corporate governance–performance relation 
models. These sources of endogeneity are: unobservable heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic 
endogeneity  (Wintoki et al., 2012). The presence of at least one form of endogeneity leads to 
inconsistent and inefficient estimates and unreliable inferences (Roberts and Whited, 2011, Schultz 
et al., 2010). 
There are a number of methods to address endogeneity. For example, inclusion of instrumental 
variables, fixed effects models and generalised methods of moments (GMM) estimates. In order 
for a variable to be used as an instrumental variable, Wooldridge (2002) states that two conditions 
must be satisfied. First, the instrumental variable must be uncorrelated with the error term of the 
model. Second, it should be partially correlated with one of the endogenous variables. However, 
Wooldridge (2002) further states that it is extremely difficult to find an instrumental variable which 
satisfies these two conditions making this approach difficult to implement. 
Fixed effects models can potentially eliminate the bias arising from unobservable heterogeneity 
(Wintoki et al., 2012). However, Schultz et al. (2010) argue that fixed effects panel specifications 
only produce consistent parameter estimates under the assumption of strict exogeneity. However, 
as discussed above, it has been widely documented that the governance–performance relation is 
subject to simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity (see for example, Coles et al., 2008,  and, Welch, 
2003). This simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity violate the strict exogeneity assumption of the 
fixed effects panel estimation procedure, as it results in the regressors being contemporaneously 
correlated with the errors (Schultz et al., 2010). To test for the presence of endogeneity we used 
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the standard Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test (Durbin, 1954, Hausman, 1978, Wu, 1973). The 
results are reported in Table 1 which shows that apart from Capital and Beta all of the variables 
are endogenous. Therefore, using OLS or fixed effects would produce inconsistent estimates. 
Table 1 DWH test results 
Independent and control variables F-test p-value 
NCI 4.34 0.037 
Board Independence 77.85 0.000 
Remuneration 9.36 0.002 
Board Size 4.60 0.032 
Directors’ share ownership  4.17 0.014 
Extra Committees 8.44 0.003 
Internal Controls 17.61 0.000 
Leverage 10.70 0.001 
Firm Size 8.08 0.005 
Capital 0.06 0.808 
Beta 0.34 0.559 
Liquidity 3.68 0.055 
 
To overcome these problems we follow Wintoki et al. (2012) and use a dynamic GMM estimator, 
as proposed by Arellano & Bover (Arellano and Bover, 1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). GMM 
is designed for panel data where the time period is short (i.e. <= 10) and many individuals (whether 
countries, firms, people or in the current research, financial firms); with independent variables that 
are not strictly exogenous (Roodman, 2009).  
Following Ammann et al. (2011) the model is implemented in three steps: first, the regression 
equation is rewritten as a dynamic model that includes lagged performance as an explanatory 
variable. Second, we take first differences of all variables which control for unobservable 
heterogeneity and eliminate a potential omitted variables bias. Third, we estimate the model by 
GMM and use lagged values of the governance variables and performance as instruments. 
Ammann et al. (2011) suggest using the lagged variables as instruments for the present values of 
these variables, as doing so controls for potential simultaneity and reverse causality. Furthermore, 
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an additional advantage of this approach is that GMM estimates are robust to dynamic 
endogeneity, firm fixed effects, endogenous regressors, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation 
(Schultz et al., 2010). 
Following Kaczmarek et al. (2012) and Wintoki et al. (2012) we estimate the following model: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽4𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 +
𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖            (1) 
Where Yit is the dependent variables used in the study (i.e. firm performance) for i =1 … N 
financial firms across t = 2003, 2004….. 2010 years. Monitoring represents the corporate 
governance variables related to monitoring (Board independence, extra board committees, internal 
control systems and board size).  Incentives represent corporate governance mechanisms in relation 
to directors’ incentives (directors’ share ownership and remuneration), whereas Control represents 
a number of control variables used. Finally,  εit = ui + ωit is the standard fixed/random effects 
decomposition of the error term.  
Four models are run to analyse the hypothesised relationship between governance and 
performance. First, the relationship between the various governance mechanisms and performance 
is analysed in the pre-crisis period (2003–2006) using one model each for both dependent 
variables. Second, the same process is repeated for each of the dependent variables during the 
crisis period (2007–2010) using another two models. 
The sample consists of 86 financial firms2 listed on FTSE 350 for the period 2003–2010, that had 
been listed for at least three years before 2007. Comparison between the pre-2007 and post-2007 
time periods requires that the sample includes the same set of companies in both periods for 
meaningful comparison.  
                                                 
2 Financial firms are all those firms for which Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) is 8000. It includes banks, 
insurance companies, real estate and financial services. 
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Data for this study is collected from four sources; Morningstar Company Intelligence (previously 
known as Hemscott Guru Database), companies’ annual reports, DataStream, and Companies 
House. Data for non-compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code were manually 
collected from the annual reports of each company, which were mostly downloaded from 
Morningstar Company Intelligence or otherwise downloaded from companies’ websites. Data for 
other corporate governance variables i.e. board size, board independence, remuneration, and 
directors’ share ownership were collected from Morningstar Company Intelligence and the 
financial data were collected from DataStream. For those companies that were delisted at some 
point in the period after 2007 data was not available with Morningstar Company Intelligence or 
on their websites. Therefore, in this case data was gathered from Companies House. 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables in the analysis include firm performance which is measured by two 
proxies TSR (total shareholder returns), and ROE (return on equity). TSR is calculated as the sum 
of capital gains and dividend yields (Shabbir and Padgett, 2008). The return on equity (ROE) is 
calculated as net income (net profit after tax) divided by the book value of equity. 
Independent variables 
Non-compliance index (NCI) 
The non-compliance index (NCI) is the main explanatory variable of the study. The index is 
constructed by assigning one point for each occurrence of non-compliance with the UK Corporate 
Governance Code. For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code recommends that the role of 
chairman and CEO should not be performed by one individual. So if a company complies with this 
provision a value of 0 is assigned and if not a value of 1 is assigned. This method of constructing 
the corporate governance index is consistent with the existing literature (for example, Bauer et al., 
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2004, Bebchuk et al., 2009, Bhagat and Bolton, 2008, Brown and Caylor, 2006, Farag et al., 2014, 
Gompers et al., 2003, Klapper and Love, 2004, Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012, Shabbir and Padgett, 
2008). 
 The non-compliance index is based on the 2003, 2006 and 2008 versions of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code. A total of 22 provisions are included in the index, so the non-compliance score 
for each company could vary between 0 (fully compliant) and 22 (fully non-compliant).  
Table 2 Definitions for dependent, independent and control variables used in the study 
Variable name Definition 
Dependent variables   
Total Shareholder Returns (TSR %) The sum of capital gains and dividend yields.  
Return on Equity (ROE %) Net income divided by book value of equity. 
Independent variables   
Non-compliance index (NCI) 
A score ranging between 0 and 22. Showing the level of non-
compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
Board Size The total number of directors on board. 
Board Independence The ratio of NEDs to total board size. 
Directors’ share ownership (%) 
The total percentage of equity shares held by all board 
members. 
Remuneration in £ million The total remuneration paid to directors. 
Extra committees 
The number of extra committees in addition to audit, 
remuneration, and nomination committee. 
Internal Controls The number of internal control systems in place. 
Control variables   
Liquidity The ratio of a firm’s current assets to current liabilities. 
Capital Ratio (%) The percentage of total equity to total assets. 
Beta value  A measure of company riskiness. 
Sales in £million Natural log of total sales. 
Leverage The percentage of total debt to assets. 
 
Control variables 
A number of control variables have been included in the empirical model of the study. We control 
for firms size because larger firms will have access to more resources and are likely to perform 
better during difficult economic times (Fama and French, 1992, Mitton, 2002, Vafeas and 
Theodorou, 1998, Van Essen et al., 2013, Weir et al., 2002). The natural log of total sales is used 
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as a proxy for firm size (Shabbir and Padgett, 2008). Availability of liquid resource could also 
have implications for firm performance, we therefore, control for liquidity (Hunter, 1982). 
Liquidity will be measured as the ratio of a firm’s current assets (cash, inventory and receivables) 
to current liabilities (payable in the next 12 months). Corporate governance literature shows that 
the amount of capital available to a firm could have major implications for its performance, 
especially in crisis situations. Therefore, to capture the effects of capital on firm performance, the 
capital ratio defined as the ratio of total equity to total assets (Beltratti et al., 2009) will be used as 
a control variable in this study. Relative riskiness of a firm could also affect its financial 
performance, we therefore control for risk by using market beta (a measure of risk) as a control 
variable in the study (Bae et al., 2012, Beiner et al., 2006, Belkhir, 2009, Beltratti and Stulz, 2012, 
Welch, 2003). Finally, the level of debt financing could have implications for firm performance 
both in normal as well as in crisis times. Therefore, leverage defined as total debt to total assets 
(Weir et al., 2002) is also used as a control variable (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, Bevan and 
Danbolt, 2002, Bevan and Danbolt, 2004, Black and Kim, 2012, Black et al., 2012, Brav, 2009, 
Coles et al., 2012, Short and Keasey, 1999, Vander Bauwhede, 2009). 
Table 3 outlines the descriptive statistics for all these variables. Table 3 shows that the average 
non-compliance index score over the period analysed was 3.57 and had a maximum value of 16. 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics for all variables 
Variables Observations3 Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
TSR (%) 679 9.80 33.54 -94.96 181.37 
ROE (%) 679 2.50 6.66 -36.10 32.50 
NCI 679 3.57 2.96 0.00 16.00 
Board independence 679 0.72 0.21 0.14 1.00 
Board size 679 8.18 2.95 3.00 20.00 
Directors’ share ownership (%) 679 2.43 5.34 0.00 54.71 
Remuneration (£million) 679 2.80 3.41 0.04 27.53 
Extra committees 679 1.24 1.16 0.00 5.00 
Internal controls 679 9.88 2.57 0.00 14.00 
Beta 679 1.06 0.48 0.05 3.37 
Liquidity 679 2.40 3.76 0.00 33.59 
Leverage (%) 679 21.85 22.00 0.00 130.21 
Sales (£million) 679 3.97 11.53 0.00 74.30 
Capital (%) 679 57.86 39.57 -41.83 174.01 
 
4. Results and discussion 
To test for multicollinearity we use Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) and tolerance statistics, the 
results are reported in Table 4. As the maximum value for VIF is 1.56 and the lowest value for 
tolerance statistic is 0.62177 indicating  no multicollinearity  problem as all VIFs remain well 
below the commonly used threshold of 10 (Field, 2009). Similarly, the tolerance statistic for all 
variables is above the threshold of 0.10, which again gives us no reason to believe that 
multicollinearity is an issue (Field, 2009). 
  
                                                 
3 The total observations should have been 688 but two years data was missing for two companies, one year data was 
missing for another two companies and three years data was missing for one company. Therefore, the total 
observations add up to 679 (688 – 9). 
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Table 4 Variance Inflation Factors and Tolerance Statistics (calculated by author) 
Independent and control variables VIF 1/VIF   
NCI 1.28 0.778495 
Board Independence 1.14 0.875011 
Remuneration 1.55 0.645824 
Board Size 1.61 0.621877 
Directors’ share ownership  1.07 0.936005 
Extra Committees 1.29 0.776662 
Internal Controls 1.14 0.874994 
Leverage 1.24 0.804459 
Firm Size 1.25 0.797109 
Capital 1.56 0.641907 
Beta 1.05 0.950501 
Liquidity 1.09 0.919612 
Mean VIF 1.27   
 As recommended by Arellano & Bond (1991) we also carry out two post specification tests 
following the GMM estimation. The first test is Hansen–Sargan J– test (Hansen, 1982, Sargan, 
1958) for over-identifying restrictions. This test is used to check the validity of the moment 
conditions. The second test is of residual autocorrelation (AR), which is used to test that the second 
order autocorrelation is zero. Table 5 shows that the null hypothesis of valid restrictions cannot be 
rejected for all of the four models. Therefore, this implies that the instruments used in models are 
valid. Similarly, Table 5 also shows that there is no serial autocorrelation of second order (AR2) 
in any of the models.  
Corporate governance and the performance of firms 
Table 5 provides the GMM regression results for the relationship between corporate governance 
variables and the two measures of firm performance for the pre-crisis and crisis period. As Table 
5 shows, the main explanatory variable of the study the NCI is significantly negatively associated 
with both measures of performance. Table 5 also shows that as reflected by the coefficients the 
negative association between NCI and performance is stronger during the financial crisis period. 
Therefore, we accept H1 which states that there is a negative relationship between the level of 
non-compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code and the performance of financial firms. 
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This result supports the view that non-compliance with a prescribed code of good corporate 
governance could have negative implications for the performance of firms, and is consistent with 
(Bebchuk et al., 2009, Cremers and Nair, 2005, Farag et al., 2014, Gompers et al., 2003). Non-
compliance with a prescribled code of good governance could inidicate that such firms have weak 
monitoring anc control mechanisms in place to control agency problems. Therefore, the agency 
problems could lead to a decrease in shareholders’ wealth. 
The sample period of the study includes an economic time period where financial firms around the 
world (including UK) faced extreme difficulties and such companies exprerienced poor 
performance. Therefore, it is possible that the decline in performance was a result of an external 
shock rather than non-compliance. However, it can be argued that even if that is the case decline 
in the performance of compliant firms should be less than those of non-compliant firms. This is 
because compliant firms are expected to have better governance and cotnrol mechanisms in place 
to face difficult times. 
To this end we divide the sample into compliant and non-compliant firms on the basis of their NCI 
score and compare the percentage decrease in their TSR & ROE during the crisis period (2007–
2010). We divide the sample into two groups ‘Compliant firms’ with an NCI score of less than 74 
and ‘Non-compliant firms’ with an NCI of 7 or more. Results as shown in Panle A (Table 6), 
confirming that the percentage decrease in the ROE of the ‘Non-compliant firms’ is significantly 
higher than the decrease in the ROE of ‘Compliant firms’ during the crisis period.  
With respect to UK studies this result supports Dahya & McConnel (2007) and can also be 
considerd as consistent with (Arcot et al., 2010).  Arcot et al. (2010), who study a sample of 245 
                                                 
4Ideally 11 should have been chosen as this will indicate non-compliance with 50% or more provisions but only 2% 
firms had an NCI score of 11 or more. Therefore, a meaningful comparison was not possible. Furthermore, an NCI 
score of 7 is almost two times the sample mean NCI of 3.57, indicating a relatively higher level of non-compliance as 
compared with the other firms in the sample. 
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non-financial FTSE 350 firms over the period 1998–2004 show that the level of compliance with 
the UK Corporate Governance Code5 has increased. The increase in the level of compliance with 
the Code as reported by Arcot et al. (2010) could indicate that over the years companies have 
realised the importance of compliance. This is because results of this research show that non-
compliance is negatively associated with performance of financial firms.  
Table 5 also shows that board independence is significantly negatively associated with both 
measures of performance. This finding does not support the hypothesised positive relationship 
between increased monitoring (represented by board independence) and performance. However, 
this finding is consistent with a number of recent studies that report a negative relationship between 
board independence and performance of financial firms (Adams, 2012, Aebi et al., 2012, Belkhir, 
2009, Beltratti and Stulz, 2012, Erkens et al., 2012, Pathan, 2009, Van Essen et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, the coefficients for board independence and both measures of performance have 
increased substantially during the crisis period when compared with the pre-crisis period. Table 5 
shows that the coefficients for TSR (-52.83), and ROE (-7.615) in the crisis period. On the other 
hand, Table 5 also shows that the coefficients for board independence during the pre-crisis period 
are TSR (-12.49) and ROE (-1.46). This could indicate that the negative impact of higher numbers 
of NEDs representation increases during a financial crisis and is consistent with the results reported 
by Van Essen et al. (2013). 
To confirm that this negative impact is not the result of the financial crisis we divide the sample 
into two groups on the basis of NED ratio of 0.506. A firm with a ratio of 0.50 or more is classified 
as ‘Higher NED ratio’ and a firm with a ratio of less than 0.50 is classified as ‘Lower NED ratio’. 
                                                 
5 Known as Combined Code at the time 
6 Principle A 3.3 of the 2003 code states that except for smaller companies at least half of the board excluding the 
chairman should be independent non-executive directors. Therefore, 0.50 is a suitable ratio to distinguish between 
independent and non-independent boards. 
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As reported in Panel B (Table 6) the percentage decrease in the performance of firms with ‘Higher 
NED ratio’ is significantly higher than those with a ‘Lower NED ratio’ in the crisis period, 
confirming the negative impact of financial crisis on performance is more severe in the financial 
firms with a higher number of NEDs. 
There could be a number of explanations for the negative relationship between board independence 
and firm performance. Choi & Hasan (2005) argue that the managerial hegemony theory i.e. where 
the non-executive directors’ dependency on top management, explains the negative relationship 
between the number of non-executive directors on a board and firm performance. Lack of adequate 
knowledge and information about the firm’s business may also be responsible for this negative 
relationship (Adams, 2012, Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). Simply increasing the number of NEDs 
may therefore not be sufficient for performance improvement. 
Explaining the negative relationship between board independence and performance, Beltratti & 
Stulz (2012) argue that during the financial crisis, banks chose shareholder friendly boards (i.e. 
boards with higher number of NEDs) as they were exposed to more risks due to their strategies. It 
was the risky strategies of the banks, rather than the good governance mechanisms, which have 
led to poor performance during the crisis. However, it can be argued that  if the banks performed 
poorly due to excessive risk taking and not due to the higher number of NEDs, then this could 
indicate that NEDs have failed to do their job (i.e. to monitor and challenge excessive risk taking). 
Therefore, increasing the representation of NEDs on boards could negatively affect firm 
performance. Similarly, Adams (2012) argues that as the NEDs have less knowledge of the 
working of the company, they might not be able to provide strategic advice or monitor executive 
management when it is needed most.  
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There is another explanation for the negative relationship between board independence and the 
performance of firms. Lipton & Lorsch (1992) argue that personal costs to directors fall in large 
boards, which gives rise to ‘free riding’. This argument could also be extended to the NEDs, as in 
the case of poor firm performance, it is the executive directors who are held responsible. Therefore, 
the personal cost to NEDs is very minimal when their firm is not performing well. This means that 
NEDs will lack motivation to monitor executive directors and protect the interests of shareholders. 
Hence, increasing the number of NEDs on board will lead to increased costs without having any 
positive impact on the performance of firms. 
Furthermore, Table 5 shows that another key monitoring tool the number of internal control 
systems in place within an organisation is positively associated with performance. This finding 
supports H2 that there is a positive relationship between effective monitoring (in this case 
represented by the number of internal control systems) and the performance of financial firms. The 
finding related to internal controls is consistent with the findings of Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009), 
who argue that firms with weak internal control systems are more likely to report new losses, miss 
quarterly analyst forecast and show a decrease in book-to-market ratio. This finding extends the 
literature on internal control systems as a monitoring tool to protect the interests of shareholders. 
This finding shows that as predicted by agency theory, internal control systems could minimise 
the conflict of interest between agents and principals, thus leading to improved firm performance. 
Therefore, this implies that in our sample those financial firms that had introduced more internal 
control systems performed better. 
In addition, the results reveal that board size is positively associated with both measures of firm 
performance during the crisis period. Therefore, again supporting H2 which states that effective 
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monitoring (in this case represented by board size) is positively associated with the performance 
of financial firms. 
However, as reported in Table 5 board size is negatively associated with performance in the pre-
crisis period. This could indicate that some corporate governance variables have different impact 
on the performance of firms during different time periods, because different governance 
mechanisms will be suitable for different time periods (Aguilera et al., 2008, Desender et al., 2013, 
Dowell et al., 2011, Judge, 2012, Van Essen et al., 2013). As reported by Van Essen et al. (2013) 
using the same set of governance variables for different contexts might not work. This finding 
would indicate that having larger boards during crisis time might be beneficial, as this would 
connect such a firm to key resources (Mangena et al., 2012). 
Table 5 shows that as far as extra committees on board are concerned our results are statistically 
not significant for the pre-crisis period but the coefficient sign is negative for both measures of 
performance. During the crisis period, consistent with McKnight & Weir (2009) the relationship 
is significantly negative for ROE. This could indicate that increasing the number of board 
committees might be detrimental for firm performance during a financial crisis and is consistent 
with the view that board committees lead to more agency costs (McKnight and Weir, 2009). 
Results show that of the two incentive mechanisms analysed in this study directors’ share 
ownership could be considered as more effective for aligning their interests with shareholders. 
Table 5 shows that directors’ share ownership is positively associated with firm performance in 
both time periods for both measures of performance. Consistent with agency theory this finding 
supports H3 which states that there is a positive relationship between directors’ incentives (in this 
case represented by directors’ share ownership) and the performance of financial firms (Fama, 
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1980, Florackis, 2005, Florackis and Ozkan, 2008, Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Mangena et al., 
2012). 
On the other hand Table 5 shows that there is a negative relationship between remuneration and 
performance. This findings contradicts H3 which states that there is a positive relationship between 
directors’ incentives (in this case represented by remuneration) and the performance of financial 
firms. This finding shows that remuneration is not an effective tool to align directors’ and 
shareholder’s interest. Morck et al. (1988) and Denis et al. (2006) also report a negative 
relationship between remuneration and firm performance and argue that higher remuneration could 
be the result of weak internal corporate governance mechanisms within a firm. Similarly, 
explaining the negative relationship between executive compensation and firm performance, 
Cheng et al. (2015) argue that firms with high executive remuneration experienced poor 
performance during the financial crisis.  
Table 5 shows that in terms of statistical significance the negative impact of remuneration on 
performance is more severe during the financial crisis as compared with the pre-crisis results. This 
result shows that those financial institutions that paid higher remunerations to their directors to 
align their interests with the interests of shareholders performed worse during the financial crisis 
and is consistent with (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011, Van Essen et al., 2013). 
Directors’ share ownership and remuneration both are mechanisms which are expected to align 
directors’ interests with shareholders. However, results of the study show that its impact on 
performance is not the same. The reason for this could be that the remuneration structures at these 
financial institutions encouraged a short term view and excessive risk taking. Indeed, Mehran et 
al. (2011) postulate a positive association between remuneration and risk taking in banks. 
Similarly, Cheng et al. (2015) show that compensation is higher at riskier firms. Therefore, for the 
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sample firms it could well be the case that higher remunerations were paid to directors that 
encouraged excessive risk taking but it did not translate to improved financial performance. In 
fact, the negative relationship between remuneration and performance is stronger in the crisis 
period when compared with the pre-crisis period. This could indicate that excessive risk taking 
behaviour could have led to poor performance during financial crisis. On the other hand, directors’ 
incentives in the form of increased ownership in the firm would encourage directors to take a long 
term view and will improve performance of firms. Therefore, it could be argued that directors’ 
share ownership is more effective mechanism to align directors’ interests with shareholders. 
As far the control variables are concerned results show that leverage as well as Beta are negatively 
associated with performance in the crisis period. This result also demonstrates that high leveraged 
and more risky firms underperformed during the crisis and is consistent with most of the existing 
literature (such as, Adams, 2012, Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, Belkhir, 2009, Beltratti and Stulz, 
2012, Short and Keasey, 1999, Weir et al., 2002).  
31 
 
Table 5 Regression results for corporate governance and the performance of financial firms 
for the sample period 2003–2010 
 Pre–crisis (2003-2006) During–crisis (2007–2010) 
 TSR 
 
ROE 
 
TSR ROE 
VARIABLES   
L.1 -0.474*** -0.880*** -0.273*** -0.165*** 
 (0.0438) (0.108) (0.00535) (0.0105) 
L.2 - - -0.408*** -0.777*** 
 - - (0.00675) (0.00596) 
NCI -0.347 -0.457*** -1.645** -0.246*** 
 (0.435) (0.134) (0.696) (0.0898) 
Board Independence -12.49*** -1.146* -52.83*** -7.615*** 
 (3.170) (0.647) (3.292) (0.517) 
Remuneration -0.285 -0.115** -0.496*** -0.0691*** 
 (0.266) (0.0545) (0.152) (0.0189) 
Board Size -1.186** -0.181 1.432*** 0.464*** 
 (0.485) (0.119) (0.321) (0.0408) 
Directors' share 
ownership 
0.416*** 0.0604 0.380*** 0.0650* 
 (0.140) (0.0982) (0.0563) (0.0333) 
Extra Committees -1.984 -0.404 -2.253 -1.565*** 
 (1.804) (0.309) (1.598) (0.178) 
Internal Controls 3.006*** 0.592*** 4.567*** 2.256*** 
 (0.642) (0.188) (0.701) (0.105) 
Leverage 0.134* 0.0367*** -0.960*** -0.0312*** 
 (0.0787) (0.0109) (0.0486) (0.00642) 
Firm Size -0.114 -0.0311* -0.126 -0.0439*** 
 (0.152) (0.0165) (0.0882) (0.0142) 
Capital 0.212*** 0.0465*** 0.737*** 0.100*** 
 (0.0438) (0.0103) (0.0282) (0.00701) 
Beta -4.933 -0.791 -8.879*** -2.994*** 
 (6.064) (0.839) (0.870) (0.195) 
Liquidity 0.0515 -0.142*** 0.196 -0.0353 
 (0.245) (0.0474) (0.223) (0.0406) 
Constant 7.383 -7.050** -41.31*** -14.72*** 
 (12.26) (2.849) (8.179) (1.159) 
J-test (p-value) 33.72(0.142) 75.45(1.00) 79.75(1.00) 39.750(.22) 
AR (1) (p-value) -3.21(0.001) -3.04(0.002) -4.86(0.000) -2.84(0.004) 
AR (2) (p-value) -0.43(0.918) 0.18.(0.85) -1.53(0.125) -0.62(0.53) 
Observations 258 258 335 335 
Number of firms 86 86 86 86 
Table 5 provides the results when the data is analysed for the pre-crisis period (i.e. 2003–2006) and crisis period (i.e. 
2007–2010). TSR and ROE are dependent variables. L.1 & L.2 are lags 1and 2  respectively of the dependent variables 
The independent variables are NCI (level of non-compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code), Board size 
(total number of board members), Board independence (the ratio of non-executive directors on board), Remuneration 
(total remuneration of board members), Directors’ share ownership (total percentage of shares held by the board of 
directors), Leverage (the ratio of total debt to assets), Beta (a measure of systematic risk), Extra committees (the 
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number of extra board committees in addition to nomination, audit, and remuneration committees), Internal controls 
(the number of internal control systems in place within the company), Firm size (log of total sales), Liquidity (the ratio 
of current assets to current liabilities), Capital (the ratio of total equity to total assets). *** significance at p<0.01, ** 
significance at p<0.05, * significance at p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 6 Mean comparisons of the performance of companies divided on the basis of 
NCI score and NED ratio 
Variables Compliant firms Non-compliant firms t p-value 
Panel A NCI<7 NCI>=7     
TSR 43.1631 11.6600 0.3069 0.759 
ROE 83.9753 -148.1080 39.6115 0.076 
Panel B Lower NED ratio Higher NED ratio t p-value 
 NED ratio<0.50 NED ratio>=0.50   
TSR -79.8983 -271.4492 -1.4002 0.1624 
ROE 81.3297 -67.7933 -1.4976 0.0135 
 
 
5. Robustness tests 
To test the robustness of the results, we analysed the data for the whole sample period i.e. 2003–
2010, these results are reported in Table 7. As a robustness test we also used ROA as an alternative 
measure of firm performance the results are reported in Table 8. Tables 7 & 8 show that the main 
explanatory variable NCI is still negatively associated with firm performance during the pre-crisis 
period, crisis period, as well as when the data is analysed for the whole sample period. This shows 
that results of the study are robust even if a different measure of performance is used.  
Similarly, board independence is still negatively associated with firm performance when data is 
analysed for the whole sample period and also when ROA is used as a measure of firm 
performance. The positive impact of directors’ share ownership and internal control systems is 
also robust to the use of different measures of performance as well as when the data is analysed 
for the whole sample period.  
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Table 7 Regression results for corporate governance and the performance of financial firms 
for the whole sample period (2003–2010) 
 (Whole period) 
2003–2010 
(Whole period) 
2003–2010 
VARIABLES TSR ROE 
L.1 -0.264*** -0.195*** 
 (0.00761) (0.00476) 
L.2 -0.406*** -0.758*** 
 (0.00994) (0.00727) 
L.3 -0.0788*** - 
 (0.0145) - 
NCI -1.830* -0.368*** 
 (1.054) (0.0753) 
Board Independence -55.22*** -6.166*** 
 (3.426) (0.372) 
Remuneration -1.600*** -0.0535*** 
 (0.251) (0.0144) 
Board Size 2.480*** 0.507*** 
 (0.398) (0.0531) 
Directors’ share ownership  0.106** 0.120*** 
 (0.0470) (0.0312) 
Extra Committees -0.211 -1.333*** 
 (2.073) (0.203) 
Internal Controls 5.933*** 1.826*** 
 (0.951) (0.0884) 
Leverage -0.952*** -0.0127*** 
 (0.0494) (0.00238) 
Firm Size -0.0172 -0.0554*** 
 (0.149) (0.00517) 
Capital 0.719*** 0.0944*** 
 (0.0389) (0.00507) 
Beta -2.180* -2.592*** 
 (1.201) (0.152) 
Liquidity 0.484** -0.0419 
 (0.198) (0.0267) 
Constant -45.40*** -12.45*** 
 (9.582) (0.952) 
J-test (p-value) 79.86(1.00) 44.96(1.00) 
AR (1) (p-value) -4.89(0.000) -2.99(0.002) 
AR (2) (p-value) -1.62(0.1038) -0.38(0.69) 
Observations 421 507 
Number of firms 86 86 
Table 7 provides the results when the data is analysed for the whole sample period (i.e. 2003–2010) all the variables 
are exactly the same as those used in Table 5. L.1, L.2 & L.3 are lags 1, 2 and 3 respectively of the dependent variables. 
*** significance at p<0.01, ** significance at p<0.05, * significance at p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 8 Regression results for corporate governance and the performance of financial firms 
for the three time periods using ROA as a measure of firm performance. 
 (Whole Period) 
2003–2010 
(Pre-crisis) 
2003–2006 
(During crisis) 
2007–2010 
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROA 
L.1 0.651*** 0.529*** 0.632*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0492) (0.0138) 
L2. -0.997***  -1.059*** 
 (0.0225)  (0.0242) 
L3. 0.0126   
 (0.0196)   
NCI -0.954*** -0.413*** -0.826*** 
 (0.0767) (0.124) (0.0555) 
Board Independence -8.312*** -0.237 -7.947*** 
 (0.607) (0.429) (0.489) 
Remuneration -0.168*** -0.164** -0.166*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0652) (0.0125) 
Board Size -0.612*** -0.109 0.532*** 
 (0.0388) (0.0731) (0.0266) 
Directors’ share 
ownership  
0.0199 0.142** 0.0122 
 (0.0147) (0.0564) (0.0112) 
Extra Committees -0.395 -0.423 -0.505 
 (0.287) (0.311) (0.313) 
Internal Controls 1.182*** 0.300** 1.343*** 
 (0.102) (0.125) (0.116) 
Leverage -0.0859*** -0.0132 -0.0797*** 
 (0.00521) (0.0104) (0.00572) 
Firm Size -0.0519*** -0.0287* -0.0573*** 
 (0.00896) (0.0148) (0.0146) 
Capital 0.0443*** 0.0284*** 0.0337*** 
 (0.00333) (0.00890) (0.00299) 
Beta -3.918*** -2.554*** -3.799*** 
 (0.179) (0.651) (0.153) 
Liquidity -0.0185 0.0552* 0.0284 
 (0.0223) (0.0308) (0.0191) 
Constant 11.30*** 0.239 8.798*** 
 (0.963) (1.934) (1.144) 
J-test (p-value) 76.57(1.00) 37.92(0.29) 73.34(1.00) 
AR (1) (p-value) -2.86(0.004) -1.45(0.146) -2.84(0.004) 
AR (2) (p-value) -0.92(0.354)  -0.89(0.369) 
Observations 421 258 335 
Number of firms 86 86 86 
Table 8 provides the results when the data is analysed for the three time periods using ROA as dependent variable. 
All independent variables are exactly the same as those used in Table 5. L.1, L.2 & L.3 are  lags 1, 2 and 3 respectively 
of the dependent variables. *** significance at p<0.01, ** significance at p<0.05, * significance at p<0.1. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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6. Conclusion 
Using a sample of UK financial firms we tested the effectiveness of firm-level corporate 
governance mechanisms for reducing agency problems and improving firm performance in two 
economically different time periods. Results show that non-compliance with a prescribed code of 
good corporate governance is negatively associated with performance. This shows that although 
in the UK firms can either choose to comply with the UK Corporate Governance Code or provide 
explanation for non-compliance, but the non-compliance could lead to decrease in shareholders’ 
wealth both in normal as well as extraordinary times. Furthermore, results also shows that the 
negative impact of non-compliance is more sever during the financial crisis.  
Having a greater number of internal control systems within financial firms appears to be an 
effective monitoring tool and is positively associated with both measures of performance. The least 
effective monitoring mechanism in financial firms is board independence (represented by NEDs), 
as it is negatively associated with performance. Furthermore, during the crisis period the 
performance of financial firms with more independent boards was significantly lower than their 
counterparts with less independent boards. This indicates that although all financial firms may 
have experienced poor performance during the financial crisis but the impact of financial crisis 
was more severe in the firms with more independent boards.   
Directors’ share ownership appears to be an effective mechanism to align directors’ interests with 
shareholders. This would indicate that in line with agency theory, it encourages directors to take a 
long term view and work in the best interest of shareholders. On the other hand, remuneration 
appears to be counterproductive in aligning directors’ and shareholders’ interests. There is strong 
evidence which shows that it is negatively associated with performance of financial firms and that 
the negative impact on performance is stronger during the crisis period. 
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Finally, there is some evidence in the case of board size that indicates that it impacts the 
performance of firms differently during normal and crisis times. The implications of this finding 
is that all governance prescriptions might not apply universally in different contexts and the 
optimal governance prescriptions will vary in different time periods.  
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